Legal Representation for Indigent Criminal Defendants in South Africa: Possibilities Under the 1994 Constitution by Huber, Jennifer L.
Notes
LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR INDIGENT
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA:
POSSIBILITIES UNDER THE 1994
CONSTITUTION
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is
good or bad .... He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately
to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceed-
ings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the
danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence.'
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in [an]
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
unless counsel is provided for him.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Each year, over a million South Africans attempt to defend
themselves against criminal charges without the assistance of a lawyer.
Most of them are poor, black, and young; many of them are illiterate
or uneducated, and a vast number of them are attempting to decipher
court proceedings conducted in an unfamiliar language. In the past
decade, the plight of these unrepresented criminal defendants has
been the subject of much attention both in legal academic circles and
1. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (Sutherland, J.).
2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (Black, J.).
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in courtrooms This increased attention was part of a renewed focus
on civil rights and human rights generally in South Africa, made
possible in large part by the 1989 replacement of State President
Botha by Frederik W. deKlerk, deKlerk's subsequent sharing of
power with the African National Congress (ANC), led by now-
President Nelson Mandela, and their joint efforts in creating a new,
multi-racial government. 4 The indigent accused were winning some
battles but losing the war until South Africa's new constitution,
implemented in the spring of 1994, confirmed the right of the poor to
have legal counsel provided by the State.' The inclusion of this right
in the new constitution was a major theoretical victory for indigent
defendants, but the issue is far from settled. Since the new right is
worded in less than absolute terms, courts must determine its
parameters. Courts must determine how many, and which, of the
mass of indigent defendants will actually benefit in concrete terms
from the right's existence. It is as yet unclear whether the most
important factor in determining the scope of the right will be the
ideals of equality and justice that symbolize the new South Africa, or
the practical fact that the current legal system is not structured to
support such lofty ideals.
This Note traces the theoretical groundwork for the indigent's
right to be provided with counsel and discusses the changes in the
South African legal system that will be necessary in order for the
theory behind that right to overcome the formidable obstacles that
threaten to prevent it from having any tangible effect. Part II discuss-
es the South African legal foundation for the right to be provided
with counsel, including statutory provisions, relevant caselaw, and the
1994 Constitution. Part III interprets the new constitutional right to
counsel. Part IV suggests ways in which the South African legal
system can implement this new right.
3. See, e.g., S v. Radebe; S v. Mbonani, 1988 (1) SA 191 (Transvaal Provincial Div.); S v.
Khanyile and Another, 1988 (3) SA 795 (Natal Provincial Div.); Evadne Grant, The Right to
Counsek Recent Developments in South Africa, 2 S. AFR. J. CRIM. JusT. 47 (1989); Nico Steytler,
Equality Before the Law and the Right to Legal Representation, 2 S. APR. J. Cum. JuST., 66
(1989).
4. David Stephen King Culhane, No Easy Talk South Africa and the Suppression of
Political Speech, 17 FORDHAM INTLL LJ. 896, 902 & n.17 (1994). There was some focus on
human rights before this time, but "earnest efforts to reconstitute the South African state have
occurred only in the last four years.. . ." Id. at 902.
5. S. APR CONST. (Constitution Act No. 200 of 1993) ch. 3, § 25(3)(e). For a copy of the
South African Constitution, see 28 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 1
(Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., 1994).
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II. LEGAL FOUNDATION FOR AN INDIGENT'S RIGHT
TO BE PROVIDED WITH COUNSEL
A. Statutory Law
Commentators, along with some judges, have argued that the
legal basis for publicly provided criminal defense representation has
been in existence in South African statutory law in the form of basic
rights and principles. The arguments rest primarily on two established
legal principles: the right to legal representation and the principle of
equality under the law.
Some form of a right to legal representation has been recognized
in South African statutes since very early in this century. The
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 1917 contained references
to a defendant's right to legal assistance in two separate sections.
6
Referring to pretrial proceedings, section 97 provided that: "(1) The
... legal advisers of an accused person shall have access to him," and
"(2) An accused person while the preparatory examination is being
held is entitled to the assistance of his legal advisers.",7 Referring to
trial proceedings, section 218 provided that
[e]very person charged with an offense is entitled to make his
defense at his trial and to have the witnesses examined or cross-
examined by his counsel, if the trial is before a superior court, or
by his counsel (if any), or his attorney or law agent, if the trial is
before an inferior court.8
Prior to the enactment of the 1994 Constitution, the most recent
statutory embodiment of the right to counsel was adopted in 1977. It
provides that: "[A]n accused shall be entitled to be represented by
his legal adviser at criminal proceedings, if such legal adviser is not in
terms of any law prohibited from appearing at the proceedings in
question."9 Neither the 1917 statute nor the 1977 statute provides for
the right to counsel in absolute terms. Neither statute addresses the
question of whether or not the legal adviser referred to must be hired
6. Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 1917, §§ 97,218, reprinted in STATUTEs OF
THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA 228, 300 (Cape Times Ltd. 1917).
7. Id. § 97, at 228.
8. Id. § 218, at 300.
9. Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, § 73(2), reprinted in 8 STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA 1017 (Butterworth Publishers, Ltd.) [hereinafter Crim. Pro. Act 51 of 1977].
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by the accused. However, the statutes are sufficient to establish the
existence of a right, individual to each accused, to obtain legal advice
and representation.
The principle of "equality before the law" in South African
common law is derived from both its Roman-Dutch and English legal
traditions. ° Prior to the new provisional constitution, the most
recent codification of the principle was in the 1983 Constitution,
which stated that one of the Republic's national goals was to "uphold
the independence of the judiciary and the equality of all under the
law."" While the statutory version of the principle does not
elaborate on the meaning of equality, or specify what factors are
encompassed by it, economic status has generally been thought to be
included in the understanding of equality. For example, Professor
Nico Steytler has interpreted the principle of equality, in the context
of criminal law, to mean that "access to rights should not be depen-
dent upon the race, sex or class of an accused person."' 2 Similarly,
A. Chaskalson, a criminal lawyer in South Africa, has argued that "if
the concept of equality before the law is to be given any meaningful
content, it must mean, at the very least, that a person should not be
denied effective access to the courts because of poverty."' 3  The
existence of this principle of equality has led to comparisons with
American caselaw, in which the right of an indigent accused to be
provided access to a fair trial grew out of concerns about equality. 4
Both Steytler and Chaskalson have concluded that the combina-
tion of the statutory right to counsel and the principle of equality
before the law support the corollary that an accused can not be
denied access to legal representation simply because he or she can not
afford it.' Steytler argues that the adversarial structure of South
African court proceedings makes access to the legal system and the
enforcement of legal rights dependent on the help of a lawyer.16
Following from this premise, the principle of equality before the law
10. See Steytler, supra note 3, at 67.
11. S. Amp. CONSr. (Constitution Act No. 110 of 1983) pmbl.
12. Steytler, supra note 3, at 68 (emphasis added).
13. S v. Rudman and Another, S v. Mthwana, 1992 (1) SA 343, 347 (App. Div.) (A.
Chaskalson, Heads of Argument for Appellants) [hereinafter Chaskalson, Heads of Argument
for Appellants].
14. See, eg., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634 (7th
Cir. 1975).
15. See Chaskalon, Heads of Argument for Appellants, supra note 13, at 346-47; Steytler,
supra note 3, at 69.
16. Steytler, supra note 3, at 68.
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requires that the right to legal assistance be equally accessible to all
accused persons. Equal accessibility, in turn, requires the appoint-
ment of counsel for indigent defendants who otherwise would have no
legal assistance.'7 The ultimate conclusion is that because legal
representation is a necessity in modem court proceedings, denying
indigent accused the same access to a defense as that enjoyed by a
wealthy person violates the principle of equality before the law.'"
Until very recently, however, South African courts were inclined to
disagree with this proposition.
B. Caselaw
Traditionally, South African courts have interpreted the right to
legal representation as a negative right: a court cannot place obstacles
in the way of a criminal defendant seeking legal representation, but
a court need not remove obstacles that are not of its own creation. 9
The prevailing idea that judicial officers have no authority to impede,
but no duty to facilitate, the exercise of the right is well illustrated by
dicta in the 1978 case of S v. Baloyi. In that case, the lower court
denied an accused's request for more time to find counsel. The judge
considered whether there were grounds to set aside a sentence when
the lower court denies that request. The reviewing judge commented
that where an accused does not seek counsel and no court problem
prevented access to counsel, there are no grounds for overturning a
sentence.2 ' One commentator has observed: "In practice this often
means that the right to legal representation is qualified by two
provisos: first, that the accused knows that he or she may request an
opportunity to obtain legal advice; and secondly, that he or she can
afford it."' In the decade prior to the adoption of the new provi-
sional constitution, several decisions indicated a trend towards
injecting affirmative content into the right to legal representation.
These cases made substantial progress in eradicating the first proviso,
that the accused at least knows he or she may request legal counsel,
but took only illusory steps towards eradicating the second proviso,
guaranteeing legal counsel to the indigent.
17. Id. at 67, 69.
18. Chaskalon, Heads of Argument for Appellants, supra note 13, at 346-47.
19. See, eg., S. v. Mkize 1978 (3) SA 1065; S. v. Baloyi 1978 (3) SA 290 (Transvaal
Provincial Div.).
20. 1978 (3) SA 290 (Transvaal Provincial Div.)
21. Id at 293.
22. Grant, supra note 3, at 49.
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1. Duty to Inform. The first judicial steps towards expanding
the right to representation were taken in the direction of recognizing
a judicial duty to inform an accused of his right to obtain counsel. In
1988, in S v. Radebe; S v. Mbonani, the Transvaal Provincial Divi-
sion set aside the convictions and sentences of two defendants who
had been convicted without having been informed that it was their
right to seek legal representation if they so desired.' The first
defendant, Radebe, a nineteen-year-old first-time offender, had been
convicted of theft of a motor vehicle and sentenced to four years in
prison. He had not been informed prior to trial that he had the right
to be represented by counsel.' During the trial, the defendant
presented evidence in his own defense and rested his case, and was
then asked by the magistrate conducting the trial if he wished to add
anything further.' The defendant responded that he wished to
obtain counsel? The magistrate refused his request, explaining that
it had been voiced too late, and that the defendant had had ample
time to obtain representation earlier in the proceedings.2
The second defendant, Mbonani, was identified by the appellate
court judge as one of a "mob of... youngsters" (his exact age is not
indicated) accused of throwing stones at pedestrians and automo-
biles.29 At the beginning of his trial, he was asked by the magistrate
if he intended to hire an attorney."0 Mbonani was confused by the
question. Nonetheless, the magistrate did not attempt to clarify the
23. The Transvaal Provincial Division is one of six provincial divisions of the Supreme
Court of South Africa. The divisions of the supreme court have original jurisdiction within their
boundaries and may hear appeals from lower courts. Albertine Renee van Buuren, Insufficient
Legal Representation for the Indigent Defendant in the Criminal Courts of South Africa, 17
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 381,389 n. 42 (1991). The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
South Africa is South Africa's final judicial tribunal. It has appellate jurisdiction over the
divisions of the supreme court. Id. at 389 n. 44. The lower courts consist of six regional courts,
dealing exclusively with criminal matters, and hundreds of magistrates courts. The magistrates
courts have jurisdiction over all criminal matters except for rape, treason, murder, and most civil
matters. Id. at 388 nn. 37-38. Decisions of the lower courts are reviewable by the Provincial
Divisions of the Supreme Court. Id. at 389.
24. S v. Radebe; S v. Mbonani, 1988 (1) SA 191 (Transvaal Provincial Div.).
25. Id. at 197.
26. Grant, supra note 3, at 49 (summarizing in English a portion of trial transcript reprinted
in Afrikaans in Radebe, 1988 (1) SA at 197.)
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Radebe, 1988 (1) SA at 198.
30. Grant, supra note 3, at 49 (summarizing in English a portion of trial transcript reprinted
in Afrikaans in Radebe, 1988 (1) SA at 198-99).
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question, but instead only asked the defendant whether he intended
to handle his own defense. Mbonani answered in the affirmative'
He was convicted of public violence and sentenced to ten years in
prison, with two of the years suspended, 2 a sentence characterized
by the reviewing judge as "extremely severe."'33 In his opinion for
the Transvaal Provincial Division, Judge Goldstone commended the
magistrate in Mbonani's case for introducing the subject of legal
representation, but criticized him for being too quickly satisfied that
the defendant was prepared to proceed without it, given the defenda-
nt's apparent confusion?'
Judge Goldstone discussed the prominent role played by a judge
or magistrate in facilitating criminal proceedings, particularly for an
unrepresented defendant, and made the following conclusions:
If there is a duty upon judicial officers to inform unrepresented
accused of their legal rights, then I can conceive of no reason why
the right to legal representation should not be one of them.
Especially where the charge is a serious one which may merit a
sentence which could be materially prejudicial to the accused, such
an accused should be informed of the seriousness of the charge and
of the possible consequences of a conviction.35
Elaborating, Judge Goldstone said that an accused should be encour-
aged to exercise the right to counsel, be given sufficient time to
engage counsel, and, where appropriate, be told that he may be able
to receive legal help from the Legal Aid Board. 6 Finally, the judge
found that "[a] failure on the part of the judicial officer to do this,
having regard to the circumstances of a particular case, may result in
an unfair trial in which there may well be a complete failure of
justice."'37 Judge Goldstone emphasized that in the two cases before
him the charges were serious, that there were some fairly complicated
evidentiary issues, and that the defendants had conducted neither
thorough nor effective defenses. The judge determined that in each
31. Id.
32. Radebe, 1988 (1) SA at 198.
33. Id. at 200.
34. Id. at 199-200.
35. Id. at 196.
36. See supra text accompanying notes 117-27 for a discussion of the Legal Aid Board.
37. Radebe, 1988 (1) SA at 196.
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case there had been a fatal failure of justice, requiring that the
sentences be set aside.38
The following year, in S v. Mabaso and Another, the Appellate
Division largely approved Judge Goldstone's reasoning and conclu-
sion, recognizing that a judicial officer has a "general duty" to inform
a defendant of his right to be represented by counsel.39 However,
the Appellate Division focused on Goldstone's caveat that a failure
to do so would not necessarily result in an unfair trial. The court
refused to set aside a conviction'4 obtained largely as a result of a
guilty plea made at a pretrial proceeding in which the defendant was
neither represented by counsel nor informed that he had a right to be
represented.4' The defendant was informed after the plea proceed-
ings that he had a right to be represented at trial, and he did obtain
trial counsel.42 Assuming for the sake of argument that the defen-
dant would have entered a plea of not guilty had he been advised by
counsel at the pretrial proceeding, the court nonetheless did not find
that the admission of the guilty plea at trial was unjust:
[T]here is no unfairness in admitting a man's statements not other-
wise inadmissible against him. When he is called upon to plead, the
facts alleged in the charge are peculiarly within his own knowledge,
and if his election to plead guilty results in the loss of the tactical
advantage which a denial might have brought him, that is not an
unfairness which the law can recognise.!3
Thus, although the Appellate Division recognized the existence of a
general duty to inform an accused of his right to obtain legal
representation, the court's opinion illustrated that the effects of a
failure to fulfill such a duty would rarely be deemed extreme enough
to be considered a failure of justice.
Without the substantial threat of convictions being set aside,
lower court judges will have little incentive to fulfill the duty to
inform, especially in light of the fact that providing such information
to an accused is likely to delay proceedings. Absent some concrete
steps towards enforcement, the Appellate Division's affirmation of the
judicial duty to inform may have little more effect than the declara-
38. Id at 200.
39. 1990 (3) SA 185,204 (App. Div.).
40. Id. at 209-10.
41. Id. at 196-99.
42. Id. at 194.
43. Id. at 209.
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tion of the South African Department of Justice, in 1982, that it
would request that prosecutors and magistrates advise undefended
accused of the existence of the Legal Aid Board." It is apparent
from the records that, although their cases were all heard after the
Department's declaration, neither Radebe, Mbonani, nor Mabaso
were given this advice by the prosecutor or magistrate and there is no
apparent reason to think that their cases are not representative of
general procedure.
2. Duty to Provide Counsel The most far-reaching judicial
decision interpreting and expanding the right to counsel was the 1988
landmark decision of the Natal Provincial Division, S v. Khanyile and
Another.45 The case was the combined appeal of two defendants'
convictions for housebreaking with intent to steal, resulting in a
sentence of one year imprisonment for each defendant.' The
defendants had both pleaded not guilty.47 The evidence against
them consisted solely of fingerprint matches of the defendants'
fingerprints with fingerprint impressions taken from the crime scene,
presented at trial through the testimony given by two policemen who
had obtained the prints and an expert who had made the compari-
sons.' Unrepresented by counsel, the defendants conducted no
cross-examination of the two policemen, and only a "perfunctory,
superficial, and aimless" cross-examination of the fingerprint
expert.49 The defendants relied exclusively on alibis for their
defense. The prosecution rebutted these alibis only indirectly, via the
fingerprint evidence.50
In his opinion for the Natal Provincial Division, Judge Didcott
first pointed out that the trial magistrate had failed to inform the
defendants that they were entitled to legal representation.51 Howev-
er, the judge did not simply focus on the failure to inform, because
that information, without more, would have been unlikely to make
any difference to the two defendants:
44. D.J. McQuoid-Mason, The Right to Legal Representation: Implementing Khanyile's case,
2 S. AR. J. CRiM. JUST. 57, 58 (1989) [hereinafter McQuoid-Mason, Implementing Khanyile]
(noting that it is not clear whether this request was ever implemented to any great extent).
45. 1988 (3) SA 795 (Natal Provincial Div.).
46. Id. at 796-97.
47. Id. at 797.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 799.
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My assumption... is that they would not have succeeded in getting
a lawyer, keen though each was on doing so, since they were too
poor to employ any personally and no legal aid was forthcoming.
The spotlight then shifts, moving from the right to a representation
that is obtainable and falling instead on a right to be provided with
representation once it is wanted but otherwise out of reach.52
Judge Didcott had chosen wisely the case in which to make this
spotlight shift. The odds were already stacked against Khanyile and
his fellow defendant 3 and their lack of legal assistance only wors-
ened their situation. First, the burglary that the two were accused of
committing took place seven years before the trial making the
defendants' reliance on alibis a poor tactical decision.m There are
probably few people who can plausibly remember their whereabouts
on a particular day seven years prior; further, these defendants did
not even attempt to pinpoint the crucial day, each vaguely testifying
merely that he had been in other parts of the country for the entire
year in which the burglary took place.55
Secondly, and most importantly, the prosecution's entire case
rested on the evidence analyzed and presented by the fingerprint
expert. In fact, the trial magistrate specifically held that the finger-
print evidence itself proved the falsity of the defendants' alibis.
5 6
The expert witness displayed photographs of the various fingerprint
impressions, pointing out the comparisons and explaining his conclu-
sions.57 The best that the defendants could do to rebut this testimo-
ny was to insist that the expert must be wrong.58 According to Judge
Didcott's opinion, the trial magistrate "acknowledged... how badly
[the defendants'] ignorance had handicapped them in their
endeavours to cross-examine the expert and rebut his testimony."59
Judge Didcott went on to note: "To do battle with an expert is
seldom easy, even for a skilled litigator. The men were quite at sea,
the record shows, and far beyond their depth."'
52. Id. at 800.
53. As noted by Chaskalson, the State invests a great deal of resources in the detection,
prosecution, and punishment of crime, so that from the beginning, the scales are tipped toward
the prosecution. Chaskalson, Heads of Argument for Appellants, supra note 13, at 348.
54. Khanyile, 1988 (3) SA at 797.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 798.
60. Id.
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Using the plight of Khanyile and his fellow defendant as a
springboard, the judge followed two main lines of argument to
conclude that both the existing right to counsel in South Africa and
the crisis of the undefended accused required the provision of counsel
to indigent criminal defendants. The first line of argument involved
a comparison of South Africa's right to counsel with the development
of the right to counsel in the United States. Drawing attention to the
similarity of language between the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution6 and section 73(2) of the South African Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977,62 the judge noted that both had initially
been interpreted as providing a negative right, guaranteeing counsel
only to those who could afford it.' Citing a long line of U.S. legal
precedent, Judge Didcott then concluded that the American expan-
sion of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to include the provision
of counsel for all indigents facing the possibility of imprisonment was
the result of a natural interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment64 to the U.S. Constitution.65  Noting that
the Due Process Clause has many different functions in American
jurisprudence, he concluded that in the area of criminal justice, the
Due Process Clause is equivalent to the South African common law
right to a fair trial.6 Thus, in the same way that the Sixth Amend-
ment, shaped by due process principles, supported an American
indigent accused's right to be provided with counsel, the language of
section 73(2), shaped by fair trial principles, could support a South
African indigent accused's right to the same.
Judge Didcott dismissed the "stock response in [South African]
legal circles ... to any talk of American cases"'67 that South Africa
has no bill of rights and thus the South African courts are not in a
position similar to that of the American courts with respect to
61. The Sixth Amendment reads, in relevant part, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
62. Section 73(2) reads, in relevant part: "[a]n accused shall be entitled to be represented
by his legal adviser at criminal proceedings .... Crim. Pro. Act 51 of 1977, supra note 9.
63. Khanyile, 1988 (3) SA at 809.
64. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
prohibits the deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
65. Khanyile, 1988 (3) SA at 802-07,809, citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963);
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1941); Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458 (1937); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
66. Khanyile, 1988 (3) SA at 809.
67. Id. at 808.
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protecting the rights of citizens against the legislature.68 He pointed
out that the right to counsel cases in the United States did not involve
the exercise of the judiciary's authority to overrule statutory law that
contravened the U.S. Constitution.69 No U.S. law existed which
prevented the provision of counsel to an indigent accused?0 Similar-
ly, the South African Parliament had not spoken on the issue; thus
recognition of an expanded right by the courts would not involve a
contradiction of Parliament.71
The second line of argument was a logical one-the existing right
to counsel was deemed essential to a fair trial, and a denial of that
right, at least to a defendant who had expressed a desire to exercise
it, would inevitably result in a conviction being overturned.72 Given
this, Judge Didcott then argued:
[I]f a lawyer's participation is deemed essential to the fair trial of
somebody who has one either at hand or in mind, why should it be
thought inessential to the fair trial of a man with nobody to whom
to turn because he cannot afford the expense? The result of no
lawyer is the same in both situations, after all, the layman being left
to defend himself And his handicap then is just the same, whether
he is a wealthy layman denied an opportunity that he wanted to
employ a lawyer whom he could have found or a poor one who
never sought the opportunity because it was doomed from the start
to prove futile: 3
Despite his sweeping arguments, Judge Didcott's actual conclu-
sion was much more limited than the parallel in American jurispru-
dence-the requirement of publicly provided counsel for all indigent
defendants facing possible prison terms.74 Noting that principle and
policy, without more, would have led him to the Gideon conclusion,
68. See generally § 59 of the Constitution Act 32 of 1961 (establishing that "[n]o court of
law shall be competent to enquire into or to pronounce upon the validity of any Act passed by
parliament ... ." quoted in van Buuren, supra note 23, at 390).
69. Khanyile, 1988 (3) SA at 808.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 810.
73. Id.
74. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1937), had
previously established that the Sixth Amendment required the provision of counsel to criminal
defendants who could not afford it in federal court. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340. The question in
Gideon was whether the right to have counsel provided was fundamental and essential to a fair
trial, such that the Due Process Clause made the right obligatory on the states as well. Id. at
342.
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he conceded that practical considerations, primarily a lack of
resources, prohibited South Africa from immediately following that
course. Instead, he settled temporarily on an intermediate solution
based on the U.S. Supreme Court case which Gideon had overruled,
Betts v. Brady.' Betts held that the Due Process Clause required
counsel to be provided for an indigent defendant in state courts only
when the trial judge felt that the deprivation of counsel would be
"shocking to the universal sense of justice." 76
Attempting to define more particularly the class of cases in which
the lack of counsel would prevent a fair trial, Judge Didcott initially
ruled out the least serious cases-which he defined as "those so petty
that the average person involved in them who was able to afford a
lawyer would in all probability seek none"-and the most serious
cases-defined as cases tried in the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of South African, for which pro deo counsel was
already made available.77 For the set of cases in between, the judge
outlined three factors to help identify those cases in which the lack of
representation would have the most egregious results: (1) the legal
and factual complexity of the case, (2) the accused's ability to defend
himself, and (3) the gravity of the charge and its consequences.7
The judge proposed that, in every case in which a defendant is
determined to be too poor to pay for a lawyer, the trial judge should
elicit as much information as possible in order to assess the three
factors and to determine "whether their cumulative effect is such that
the man would be placed at a disadvantage palpable and gross, that
the trial would be palpably and grossly unfair, were it to go ahead
without a lawyer for the defence."79 If the trial judge allowed the
trial to go on without defense counsel and the, defendant was
convicted, Judge Didcott proposed that the reviewing court consider
the three factors anew in order to determine whether the trial had
75. Khanyile, 1988 (3) SA at 814, citing Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1941).
76. Khanyile, 1988 (3) SA at 806, citing Betts, 316 U.S. at 462.
77. Khanyile, 1988 (3) SA at 814-15. The pro deo system is an Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court practice, not required by law, of providing counsel to indigent defendants facing
a capital charge. See R v. Mati and Others, 1960 (1) SA 304, 306-07 (Appellate Div.).
Approximately 90% of these defendants tried in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
are represented. However, the Appellate Division only hears a small percentage of criminal
trials, and the pro deo system has never been extended to lower courts. N. C. STEYrLER, THE
UNDEFENDED ACCUSED ON TRIAL 20 (Juta & Co. Ltd. 1988) [hereinafter UNDEFENDED Ac-
CUSED].
78. See Khanyile, 1988 (3) SA at 815.
79. Id. at 816.
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actually been palpably and grossly unfair, in which case the conviction
should be set aside. 0 Acknowledging that this approach was not
entirely satisfactory, the judge concluded that South Africa's present
lack of resources would not allow a more comprehensive solution."
Despite the case's relatively conservative holding, the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court overruled Khanyile four years later in
S v. Rudman and Another; S v. Mthwana.' In his opinion for the
Appellate Division, Judge Nicholas rejected Judge Didcott's reasoning
in Khanyile for two basic reasons. First, Judge Nicholas denied that
the common law principle of a right to a fair trial had the broad reach
that Judge Didcott had ascribed to it. Instead, he argued, the concept
of a fair trial is fundamentally procedural:
The Court of Appeal does not enquire whether the trial was fair in
accordance with "notions of basic fairness and justice." ... The
enquiry is whether there has been an irregularity or illegality, that
is a departure from the formalities, rules and principles of proce-
dure according to which our law requires a criminal trial to be
initiated or conducted.83
The second reason was a corollary to the first: given the procedural
slant of the fair trial principle, the appropriate question was whether
there was an existing procedural rule which required a defendant who
could not afford legal representation to have representation provided
at state expense.' Surveying the existing statutes and the caselaw
prior to Khanyile, Judge Nicholas concluded that such a rule had
never been recognized in South African law.8"
The judge did, however, recognize that the regulation of criminal
procedure, including the formulation of procedural rules, was within
the power of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court; thus, it
was arguably within the court's power to "create" a right for indigent
accused to be provided with counsel. 6 He declined to do so for two
reasons, "one of principle, the other of feasibility."'  The reason "of
principle" involved the fact that this particular procedural rule would
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. 1992 (1) SA 343 (Appellate Div.).
83. Id. at 377.
84. Id. at 378.
85. Id. at 380.
86. See id. at 381.
87. Id. at 386.
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place an enormous burden on the government, which, the judge
concluded, would be overstepping the boundaries of the court's
authority.88 As for feasibility, the Judge Nicholas concluded that,
although he did not have sufficient information on which to base a
judgement regarding long-term possibilities, it was clear that at the
time, the resources to implement the rule were simply not avail-
able. 9
C. 1994 Constitution90
South Africa's 1994 provisional constitution explicitly provides for
a right to counsel for indigent defendants, thus eradicating the need
for the South African Supreme Court to require the government to
provide legal aid. This addresses Judge Nicholas' reason "of
principle" for not forcing the government to provide counsel to the
indigent accused. Chapter 3 of the 1994 Constitution states that:
Every accused person shall have the right to a fair trial, which shall
include the ight... to be represented by a legal practitioner of his
or her choice or, where substantial injustice would otherwise result,
to be provided with legal representation at state expense, and to be
informed of these ights .... "
The question of feasibility cannot be disposed of so easily; yet it is
unclear what weight is to be attributed to this issue. Now that the
right is defined in concrete terms, it may not be a sound constitutional
88. See id. (stating that "[t]he Supreme Court has no power to issue a mandamus on the
Government to provide legal aid, and it should not adopt a rule the tendency of which would
be to oblige the Government to do so.")
89. See id. at 388-89.
90. The present constitution was drafted during constitutional negotiations in November
1993 involving representatives of both the then-existing South African government and the
ANC, and was ratified by Parliament in December 1993. Culhane, supra note 4, at 902-03. It
came into effect on April 26, 1994 with the raising of the new South African flag and the
commencement of South Africa's first all-race national elections. The new national government,
consisting of a 400-seat National Assembly and a 90-seat Senate, is planning to draft a
permanent constitution, but the provisional one is in effect until this takes place. See Mandela
and ANC Claim Victory in South Africa's First All-Race Elections, Facts on File World News
Digest, May 5,1994, at 313 Al, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter
Mandela and ANC Claim Victory]. The permanent constitution is likely to resemble the
provisional constitution. The same groups involved in drafting the provisional constitution, the
National Party and the ANC, are the two dominant groups in the new legislature. Approval of
the new constitution requires a two-thirds vote, which means that the two parties must cooperate
in drafting the permanent constitution. See Culhane, supra note 4, at 897 & nn. 2-3, 936 n. 248.
91. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 3 § 25(3)(e). Chapter 3 of the 1994 constitution is titled
"Fundamental Rights" but is also commonly referred to as the bill of rights.
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practice to allow the right to be limited by considerations of feasibili-
ty. Perhaps the right should be defined according to principles of
justice, and the practical considerations should be worked out
secondarily.
III. INTERPRETING THE NEW RIGHT TO BE PROVIDED
WITH COUNSEL
The first question that arises in this area under the new constitu-
tion is how broadly the right to counsel will be interpreted. It is as
yet undetermined what position the bill of rights will occupy in South
African jurisprudence. The language of the new constitution clearly
emphasizes that constitutional principles are to be supreme, with such
declarations as: "[T]his Constitution shall be the supreme law of the
Republic," and "[t]his Constitution shall bind all legislative, executive,
and judicial organs of state at all levels of government."' Chapter
3 of the constitution enumerates certain "fundamental" rights, and
gives the courts the power to grant relief for any infringements upon
these rights.' All of these provisions echo the American system,
making Judge Didcott's analogy in Khanyile far less strained. 4 The
new constitution's embodiment of the principle of equality before the
law is even supplemented by a guarantee of "equal protection of the
law,395 mirroring the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. 6  The emphatic language and the American
parallels seem to be inconsistent with allowing constitutional rights to
be limited by practical considerations.
On the other hand, the right to have counsel provided is
described in terms that are not absolute: legal representation is to be
provided at state expense only in situations "where substantial
injustice would otherwise result."'  It will be up to the courts to
92. Id. ch. 1, §§ 4(1), 4(2); cf. note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the subordinate
role of the South African courts in relation to the legislature prior to the enactment of the new
bill of rights).
93. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 3, § 7(4)(a) (providing that "[w]hen an infringement of or threat to
any right entrenched in this Chapter is alleged, any person ... shall be entitled to apply to a
competent court of law for' appropriate relief, which may include a declaration of rights.").
94. See supra text accompanying notes 55-62.
95. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 3, § 8(1).
96. The Fourteenth Amendment reads, in relevant part: "No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall... deny to any person.., the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
97. S. AFP. CONST. ch. 3, § 25(3)(e).
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determine where that line should be drawn." As Judge Nicholas'
opinion in Rudman illustrates, South African courts are accustomed
to operating within the confines of feasibility.99 However, the courts,
like the rest of the nation, are not accustomed to dealing with
fundamental constitutional rights. As one observer of the legal
education system has noted, "[h]uman rights, the new catch phrase in
South Africa, has yet to infiltrate the collective subconscious of the
citizenry.""1° Some theorists are even more negative, suggesting that
there is legitimate skepticism regarding constitutionally-entrenched
rights, based on historical factors both within South Africa and
worldwide. One author points out that in the past, due to continual
power struggles between colonial powers and nationalist groups,
"African political systems have not produced any respectable forms
of constitutionalism, nor have they developed any culture for the
respect of human rights."'' Another emphasizes that. the concept
of human rights has not been closely connected to people of
color."° The shift from a system in which the main function of the
courts was to carry out the letter of the law handed down by
Parliament to one in which the courts are the designated protectors
of human rights on an individual basis will not likely be a transforma-
tion that can occur overnight. Out of their element, South African
courts will be searching for guidance to interpret the provisions of
their new bill of rights.
A. The Khanyile Framework
Because it is well known and easily accessible, courts may be
tempted to resort to an implementation of the framework established
by Judge Didcott in his Khanyile opinion, conducting a fact-specific
98. Although the current constitution is a provisional one, interpretations of the right as it
appears now are likely to continue to be relevant to interpreting the parallel provisions in the
permanent constitution, which will probably be substantively similar. See supra note 90.
99. See generally D. M. Davis, An Impoverished Jurisprudence. When is a Right not a
Right?, 8 S. AFPR. J. HUM. RTs. 90, 94 (1992) (noting that "the judgement in Rudman's case
appears to be based less on a rigorous jurisprudence and more on the pragmatism of economic
priorities.").
100. Joanne Fedler, Legal Education in South Africa, 72 OR. L REv. 999, 1005 (1993).
101. Welshman Ncube, Constitutionalism and Human Rights: Challenges of Democracy, in
THE INSTTIONALISATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTHERN AFRIcA 1, 1 (Pearson Nherere
& Marina d'Engelbronner-Kolff eds., 1993).
102. Kempton Makamure, Introductory Remarks: Human Rights and Democracy in the
African Context Today: A Historical Setting, in THE INT1TUTIONALISATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, supra note 101, at v.
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inquiry in each case in order to determine whether or not counsel
should be appointed. However, such a solution would probably prove
unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, the framework relies too heavily
on judicial discretion, which, given the large number of judges
involved, does not lend itself to uniformity or equality. Khanyile
places the burden on the trial judge or magistrate to analyze the three
factors in order to determine the accused's potential ability to handle
his own defense effectively."0 While a number of judges may make
a good faith effort to conduct a thorough inquiry, at least some lower
court judges have proven willing to provide an accused the absolute
minimum assistance required by law, as evidenced by several of the
cases discussed above." 4 This amount of individual judicial discre-
tion seems more dangerous when one considers the setting in which
it is taking place: a country which until a little more than one year
ago embraced an official policy of racial inequality,"5 and in which
the vast majority of the legal power structure is white and the vast
majority of criminal defendants is black. 6
Second, the nature of the Khanyile factors requires inquiry into
information about the accused which is not ordinarily before a court
prior to trial. The first factor, the legal and factual complexity of the
case, can be fully revealed only through the arguments and testimony
presented at trial. Pre-trial attempts to evaluate complexity under the
current system will yield rough estimates at best, and attempts to
improve the accuracy of those estimates could require inquiry into
details so extensive as to make the trial itself redundant. Similarly,
the second factor, the intelligence, competence, and sophistication of
the accused, requires inquiry into details of the accused's personal
qualities, experience, and background which are not ordinarily before
the court at any time. The third factor, the gravity and consequences
of a charge, may be somewhat more susceptible to estimation, but still
cannot be precisely evaluated until the judge has determined what
103. Khanyle, 1988 (3) SA at 815.
104. See supra notes 21-24, 40-41 and accompanying text.
105. See generally STEPHEN ELLMANN, IN A TIME OF TROUBLE (1949) (discussing legal
structure of racial inequality and role of courts in the South African legal system). South Africa
ended its official policy of racial inequality on December 22, 1993, when the Parliament
approved the country's first non-racial constitution. This end was cemented by the victory of
the ANC in South Africa's open elections in April 1994. Culhane, supra note 4, at 896.
106. Steytler estimates that over 90% of criminal defendants in South African courts are
black. UNDEFENDED ACCUSED, supra note 77, at 19. Justice Department statistics from 1990
indicate that there were no black magistrates and only 28 of the 988 prosecutors were black. Van
Buuren, supra note 23, at 401 n.144.
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weight to assign to any aggravating or mitigating evidence presented
at trial. Gathering this information will require a great deal of
individualized attention from judges, and probably an extraordinary
amount of cooperation from prosecutors."°7 This degree of partici-
pation is simply incompatible with an adversarial system in which the
judge is supposed to remain neutral while the prosecution is supposed
to be advocating its own side.l"a It is unlikely that prosecutors will
be enthusiastic about providing information that could compromise
their own interests. Even if this type of inquiry from the court was
forthcoming, it would be costly and time-consuming. In all likelihood,
any attempt to go this route would lead courts to conclude that the
money and time a judicial inquiry consumes would be better spent
locating legal assistance for the accused. In the long run, a more
concrete, administratively simpler rule will probably prove more cost-
effective, even if that rule requires counsel to be provided in a greater
number of cases.
B. International Law
Fortunately, South African courts are not restricted to internal
sources for assistance in interpreting their country's bill of rights. In
the Khanyile opinion, Judge Didcott refers to two international
covenants whose provisions dealing with the right to legal assistance
are also couched in less than absolute terms."° Both contemplate
the appointment of counsel, free of charge, to criminal defendants
who cannot afford it, when "the interests of justice so require." 0
107. See McQuoid-Mason, Implementing Khanyile, supra note 44, at 61 (noting that
"prosecutors will have to play an important role in assisting magistrates in deciding whether or
not an accused should be represented.").
108. Judge Didcott himself recognized the incompatibility of excessive judicial participation
in an adversarial system, quoting from an 1826 edition of the Edinburgh Review: "Of all false
and foolish dicta, the most trite and absurd is that which asserts that the Judge is counsel for the
prisoner... The Judge cannot be counsel for the prisoner, ought not to be counsel for the
prisoner, never is counsel for the prisoner." Khanyile, 1988 (3) SA at 798.
109. Judge Didcott refers to article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which states that everyone accused of a crime should be entitled "to have legal assistance
assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by
him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it," International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 14, para. 3(d), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 177, and to
article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which states that the minimum rights
of each accused person should include the right "to defend himself in person or through legal
assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to
be given it free when the interests of justice so require," European Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6, § 3(c). Khanyile, 1988 (3) SA at 801.
110. See supra note 109.
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While this language is similar to that used in the South African Bill
of Rights, and while both formulations of the right are highly
subjective, the international covenants may require the appointment
of counsel in a greater number of cases on the margin, as they contain
no requirement that the injustice which would otherwise result be
"substantial."'' The existence of such covenants may help to
broaden the scope of the right in South Africa, as the new constitu-
tion specifically provides for reference to applicable international law
for assistance in interpreting the provisions of the bill of rights."2
The constitution admits the possibility of reference to foreign
caselaw." As discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court, albeit
using slightly different language, decided that substantial injustice
would result every time an indigent accused faced a potential prison
sentence without appointed counsel."4 Given the numerous paral-
lels between the 1994 South African Constitution and the U.S.
Constitution, if the South African drafters had intended for the right
to counsel to sweep as broadly as the American right, such scope
could have been easily conveyed. It is conceivable that the more
cautious language was used in order to allow courts, at least in the
short-term, to weigh considerations of feasibility. If this is the case,
the fate of many South African indigent criminal defendants may
depend on the implementation and the success of programs designed
to increase the quantity of legal aid funding and the number of legal
practitioners whose services are available to them.
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE NEW RIGHT TO BE PROVIDED
WITH COUNSEL
In the past, commentators have been skeptical about the
possibility of providing widespread legal assistance to indigent
criminal defendants in South Africa. For example, citing doubts
about the possibility of the adequate expansion of the legal profession
and about the probability of increased government funding for legal
111. See supra note 97; see also S. AF. CONST. ch. 3, § 25(3)(e).
112. S. AFnn CONST. ch. 3 § 35(1) provides:
In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law shall promote the values
which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and
shall, where applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the
protection of the rights entrenched in this Chapter and may have regard to comparable
foreign caselaw.
113. Id.
114. See supra note 74.
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aid in the foreseeable future, N.C. Steytler instead has advocated an
extensive reform of court procedures in order to allow unrepresented
accused to conduct their own defenses more effectively." Howev-
er, Steytler has agreed that providing legal assistance to indigent
defendants is the most desirable solution ultimately."6  Three
possibilities now appear to undermine past fears that any attempt to
follow Steytler's proposal would necessarily be quixotic. First, funds
available for legal aid are likely to be increased in the near future.
Second, improvements in cost-efficiency and changes in the structure
of the bar could allow the existing legal profession to be of much
more assistance to indigent criminal defendants than it currently is.
Third, reforms in legal education may lead to a more rapid expansion
of the legal profession, and to a legal profession better equipped to
provide assistance in criminal trials.
A. Legal Aid Funding
1. Existing Publicly Funded LegalAid. Providing legal services
to a large number of indigent criminal defendants will undoubtedly
require a great deal of money, as the existing legal aid structure is
glaringly inadequate. The budget of the Legal Aid Board has been
slowly but steadily increasing since the Board's creation." 7 The
Legal Aid Board was established by the Legal Aid Act 22 of 1969,
and first implemented in 1971."' Legal Aid offices are run not by
lawyers but by civil servants who receive the individual applications
for legal assistance and determine which are to be granted."9
Applicants must first meet a standard of indigence determined by
115. See UNDEFENDED ACCUSED, supra note 77, at 23-24. Another example of the trend
among commentators to focus, somewhat despairingly, on alternative solutions is D.J. McQuoid-
Mason's suggestion that magistrates should make more use of community service sentences in
order to reduce the incidence of injustice in sending unrepresented indigent defendants to
prison. McQuoid-Mason, Implementing Khanyile, supra note 44, at 61.
116. See UNDEFENDED ACCUSED, supra note 77, at 23.
117. Steytler noted that the Legal Aid Board budget was approximately R50,000 in 1969-70,
and R2.9 million in 1983-84. UNDEFENDED ACCUSED, supra note 77, at 21. In 1989 DJ.
McQuoid-Mason cited a promised budget of R12 million for 1988-89, 12.9 million for 1989-90,
R17 million for 1990-91, and R22 million for 1991-92. McQuoid-Mason, Implementing Khanyile,
supra note 44, at 62. Although the conversion rate varies, at the time of publication, one U.S.
dollar equals approximately 3.5 rand. See World Value ofthe Dollar, WALL ST. ., Feb. 21,1995,
at C6.
118. UNDEFENDED ACCUSED, supra note 77, at 16-17.
119. van Buuren, supra note 23, at 395.
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their monthly income." Applicants who meet this standard are
then evaluated on other factors. For example, applications from
criminal defendants are generally not accepted if the accused admits
guilt, is unemployed for no good reason, appears to lead a criminal
life, or if the Board determines that the case is so simple that the
accused should be able to handle it himself. 2' Applications that are
accepted are referred to attorneys in private practice, who are then
reimbursed by the Legal Aid Board at an established fee."
Applications from criminal defendants make up a very small
percentage of the applications received by the Board," possibly
because of the rigorous standards for acceptance of those applications,
a lack of awareness of the Board's existence, or the belief that the
Board is not impartial." Although the number of applications
granted in criminal cases has been increasing, the vast majority of
cases referred by the Legal Aid Board remain civil cases."z
Funds also continue to be provided for the pro deo system in the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.'6 However, the pro deo
system and the Legal Aid Board, which together make up essentially
the entire publicly funded legal aid system,' 12 manage to provide
counsel for only a very small number of indigent criminal defendants.
2. Potential for Increased Funding for Legal Aid. It is undeni-
ably true that in the past,
120. Id.
121. Id. at 395 n.92.
122. Id. at 395. In the regional courts in 1990-91, the set rate was R600 per case. D.J.
McQuoid-Mason, Rudman and the Right to CounseL" Is it Feasible to Implement Khanyile?, 8 S.
AFP. J. HuM. RTS. 96, 99 (1992) [hereinafter McQuoid-Mason, Is It Feasible].
123. Steytler estimates that in 1983-84, criminal applications made up 11.5% of the
applications received by the Board. UNDEFENDED ACCUSED, supra note 77, at 18. Jeremy
Sarkin estimates that the number was 10.16% in 1988-89. Jeremy Sarkin, Restructuring the Legal
Profession and Access to Justice, 9 S. AFm. J. HuM. RTs., 223, 224 (1993).
124. See van Buuren, supra note 23, at 396. Legal aid officers are drawn from the same
branch of the civil service from which magistrate judges and prosecutors are drawn, potentially
leading defendants to doubt their impartiality. Id at 395 n.87.
125. McQuoid-Mason, Is It Feasible, supra note 122, at 109-10.
126. UNDEFENDED ACCUSED, supra note 77, at 22 n.99 (indicating that, in 1988, pro deo
counsel received R120 per day per accused, plus R50 for consultation). Steytler estimates that
only .1% of South African criminal cases are heard by the appellate division. ld. at 18. See also
van Buuren, supra note 23, at 396-97 (noting that legal fees for pro deo counsel are paid not
from the Legal Aid Board but from state funds appropriated for the appellate division).
127. Legal Resources Centres are another facet of publicly funded legal aid, but these
centers focus on the civil legal rights of the poor and only take those criminal cases which affect
the public interest. See McQuoid-Mason, Implementing Khanyile, supra note 44, at 65.
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parliament has shown little concern for the position of the indigent
accused and has exhibited reluctance to extend legal aid to all
accused persons. Concern for increased spending on legal aid,
particularly in criminal matters, is not a politically popular cause
and major increases in funding may not be forthcoming in the
foreseeable future.1"s
It is also undeniably true, however, that the South African
government has entered a new era, and that the new legislature, in
the position of being subordinate to the constitution, will be obligated
to show concern for the fundamental rights that the constitution has
established. Human rights have become a central issue in South
Africa and the new legislators are now accountable to an electorate
that includes the segment of the population from which most of the
indigent accused come. 29 Even that portion of the electorate which
does not identify with the indigent accused has an interest in equal
justice, both in theory and in practical terms, as "(N)o man is so
violently anti-social as the man who believes he has not had a fair
trial"'" and much of the violence in South Africa has been attribut-
ed to the dissatisfaction of a large portion of the population with the
government's disregard for human rights. The South African
government thus has both an increased responsibility and the
motivation to increase funding for services to represent indigent
defendants.
In the past, the South African government, drawing from an
increasingly impoverished nation, had very limited funds to allocate
to criminal defense. International trade sanctions against the country
contributed to the downswing of the country's economy' because
many foreign companies withdrew from the South African market.
One source indicates that more than 200 American companies
withdrew from operations in South Africa during the 1980s, largely
due to pressure from state and local goveinments to comply with the
African National Congress' campaign promoting economic pressure
to force political and social change." However, many of those
sanctions are being lifted now that the system of apartheid has been
128. UNDEFENDED ACCUSED, supra note 77, at 22.
129. See supra note 106.
130. A.J. van der Wait, Equal Access to Free and Independent Courts, 100 S. AFR. L.L 681,
688 (1983).
131. van Buuren, supra note 23, at 398.
132. Barnaby J. Feder, South African Deal Made by Food Processor Pillsbury, N.Y. TIES
Sept. 29, 1994, at Dl.
1995]
448 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 5:425
dismantled, and it is hoped that the restimulation of international
trade will rapidly improve the economy." Still, any economic
effects from the lifting of sanctions may not be felt immediately, and
the recovery of the economy is not inevitable.
Further, although the South African government has always been
the Legal Aid Board's sole source of funding, the Legal Aid Act
provides that the Board may accept funds from outside sources."
The lack of external sources of funding may be at least partially
attributable to foreign nations' disapproval of apartheid;35 there-
fore, foreign funding may also be more readily available since the
dismantling of the apartheid system, which was completed by the 1994
elections. Since the elections, foreign nations such as the United
States have proved eager to resume or to increase economic and
diplomatic relations with South Africa, including providing humanitar-
ian assistance. 6
B. Availability of Legal Services in South Africa
Increased funding will. have only very limited effects without a
corresponding increase in the number of legal practitioners available
to provide legal assistance to indigent criminal defendants. Relative
to its population, and relative to its vast number of indigent criminal
defendants, South Africa's legal profession is minuscule: for approxi-
mately twenty-six million South Africans, there are approximately
nine thousand practicing lawyers. 7 The legal profession seems to
133. See, eg., Bill Keller, Corporate Foe of Apartheid Finds Reward Elusive, N.Y. TiMES,
Dec. 9, 1994, at A4 (referring to Pepsi-Cola, which pulled out of South Africa in 1984 and
reinstituted a franchise there in 1994); Bill Keller, Aparthei4's Arms-Maker Finds Respectability,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 26, 1994, at A3 (noting that U.N. sanctions against South Africa were lifted
in May 1993); Steven A. Holmes, Mandela Looking for Free-Market Investors, N.Y. TIME, Oct.
3, 1993, § 1, at 15 (discussing a visit by Mr. Mandela to New York city and Washington, D.C.
to encourage American investments in South Africa).
134. van Buuren, supra note 23, at 394, citing Legal Aid Act, No. 22, §§ 9(1), 9(3) (S. Afr.
1969).
135. van Buuren, supra note 23, at 394 n.82 (citing an interview by the author with E.S.
Sholtz, then Director of the Legal Aid Board in Pretoria).
136. For example, on April 25, 1994, the day before the elections began, U.S. Commerce
Secretary Ronald H. Brown announced U.S. plans to increase financial aid to South Africa from
$80 million per year to more than $140 million per year, with a great deal of the aid earmarked
for humanitarian issues. See Bill Keller, The South African Vote: The Overview; More Bombings
Rattle South Africans, N.Y. TMEs, Apr. 26,1994, at Al.
137. Steytler estimated the population of South Africa at twenty-six million in 1983.
UNDEFENDED ACCUSED, supra note 77, at 21. For 1991, McQuoid-Mason estimated the number
of lawyers to be 8,748, with only 1,021 of them being advocates. McQuoid-Mason, Is It Feasible,
supra note 122, at 102. South Africa has approximately 34.6 lawyers per 100,000 people. In
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be poised for rapid growth, however, as an estimated fifteen hundred
students graduate with a law degree each year.'38 Despite the
limited number of available lawyers, changes in the way legal aid is
delivered could allow the existing legal profession to make a
substantial contribution to the free representation of indigent criminal
defendants. Changes in the paths of entry into the profession could
better utilize the skills of rising lawyers and changes in the legal
education system could not only increase the number of potential
lawyers, but also produce law graduates who are better equipped to
meet the legal needs of the population.
1. Using Existing Legal Service Providers More Efficient-
ly. The Legal Aid Board's current system of referring cases to
lawyers in private practice is simply not cost-effective for criminal
cases. Very few of the private lawyers in South Africa specialize in
criminal law. 9 Consequently, most of the lawyers to whom crimi-
nal cases are referred must go through the necessarily time-consuming
process of familiarizing themselves with the issues and the procedures
from nearly ground zero. Dr. D.J. McQuoid-Mason has conducted
extensive studies on the feasibility of a salaried public defender
program and has estimated that full-time public defenders, paid an
adequate salary by the government,"4 could handle from 2.2 to 3
times as many cases as referral lawyers currently do, for the same
cost.'4 ' McQuoid-Mason's figures are based on the estimate that
comparison, in the United States there are 312 lawyers per 100,000 people; West Germany has
190 lawyers per 100,000 people; and Chile has 104.9 lawyers per 100,000 people. The Rule of
Lawyers, ECONOMIST, July 18, 1992, at 3.
138. See Sarkin, supra note 123, at 228.
139. McQuoid-Mason cites an estimate that only 10% of South African lawyers "engage"
in criminal practice. McQuoid-Mason, Is It Feasible, supra note 122, at 102.
140. McQuoid-Mason makes his calculations based on a salary of R50,000 per year. Id at
107. In contrast, in the Johannesburg public defender office in 1991, senior public defenders
were paid R100,000 per year, and the other public defenders were paid between R45,000 and
R75,000 per year, rates that Jeremy Sarkin predicts will have a cost-inhibiting effect on the
program. Sarkin, supra note 123, at 233 n.61. For comparison, South African law professors
earn between R83,000 and R96,000 per year while law lecturers earn between R39,000 and
R74,000 per year, salaries described as "meager" compared to those earned by lawyers in private
practice. Fedler, supra note 100, at 1003 n.10. On the other hand, articled clerks earn far less,
roughly between R9600 and R19,200 per year. Sarkin, supra note 123, at 233 n.59.
141. In a 1992 article, McQuoid-Mason estimated that salaried public defenders could handle
between 2.2 and 2.8 times as many cases as referral lawyers for the same cost. McQuoid-Mason,
Is It Feasible, supra note 122, at 112; ef. McQuoid-Mason, Implementing Khanyile, supra note
44, at 63 (estimating, in 1989, that salaried public defenders could handle three times as many
cases).
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these public defenders would be able to handle at least 200 criminal
defenses per month.42 Full-time public defenders would become
familiar with the criminal court procedures and would build up an
expertise in issues common to poor defendants, thereby decreasing
the need for new research and allowing them to handle each case
more quickly and more adeptly.
An experimental public defender program, consisting of ten
full-time salaried public defenders, was set up in Johannesburg in
1991.13 This pilot program should be expanded to more jurisdic-
tions as soon as possible; given the success of the Johannesburg
program, this is not unlikely in the near future. The public defenders
could remain a part of the Legal Aid Board structure, with their
salaries paid from the Legal Aid Board budget. A portion of the cost
would be covered by the funds currently spent by the Board for
criminal referrals, while the remainder would depend on a sizeable
budget increase.' Integrating the public defenders into the existing
system would reduce start-up costs, because, depending on the
locations and sizes of Legal Aid offices, they could potentially utilize
existing Legal Aid office facilities. Although the public defenders
would be independently hired, rather than selected from the same
ranks of civil service as prosecutors, there is some possibility that
integration into the Legal Aid system may subject the public
defenders to the same perceptions of partiality that currently plague
the legal aid officers.4 5 However, at least initially, the financial
savings that could result from one integrated system will be the more
pressing concern.
Locating lawyers to fill these public defender positions should not
be difficult because there are young lawyers who need the experience
in order to fulfill their articles of clerkship requirement. The South
African legal profession currently operates under a dual-bar system
similar to that of Great Britain, with attorneys corresponding to
British solicitors and advocates corresponding to British barristers.
4 6
142. McQuoid-Mason, Is It Feasible, supra note 122, at 103. McQuoid-Mason notes,
however, that these cost comparisons are based on salaries alone, and do not include the start
up costs of implementing a new program. Id. at 107.
143. Id. at 107-08.
144. McQuoid-Mason notes, interestingly, that once a substantial portion of defendants have
legal representation, a portion of the increased budget could come from the reduction in
expenses necessary to operate prisons that will probably result from fewer criminal defendants
receiving jail sentences. Id. at 109.
145. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
146. See van Buuren, supra note 23, at 390 n.52.
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Attorneys have the initial client contact and conduct the necessary
research for a case, while advocates generally argue the cases in
court. 14 7
Due to the regulation of South African legal practitioners, the
current system of articles of clerkship' seems to thwart many law
graduates in their search for employment in the legal market,
resulting in a large pool of qualified but unemployed potential
lawyers. 49  However, a recent amendment to the Attorneys Act
allows graduates to substitute public service for the traditional two
years of articles. The articles requirement is now satisfied by either
two years of community service under the Legal Aid Board or at an
approved law clinic, or one year of such service plus a four-month
training course." ° Graduates seeking to become advocates could
complete their four to six month pupilage' under the senior public
defenders. Although both of these sources of staffing would involve
a high turnover rate, the stream of manpower would be steady and
the utilization of graduates who intend to serve for only a short time
would allow a significant reduction in cost as the graduates' salaries
could be kept very low.' Obviously, some senior public defenders
would have to be retained over long periods of time to provide
stability and guidance; otherwise most of the advantages over the
referral system would be lost. The high turnover rate would thus
cause some problems but would probably not be fatal to the program;
American public defender offices currently survive with high turnover
rates. 53
147. Id.
148. The articles of clerkship (commonly referred to as "articles") is a two-year internship
with a law firm or with a private or state attorney that law school graduates must complete
before being able to practice as an attorney. See Attorneys Act No. 53 of 1979, ch. 1, reprinted
in STATUTEs OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRCA, supra note 9, at 457.
149. Estimates of the percentage of law graduates unable to secure articles range from 60%
to 67%. See Sarkin, supra note 123, at 225; Fedler, supra note 100, at 1008. It is unclear what
percentage of law graduates actually seek articles.
150. Attorneys Amendment Act 115 of 1993, reprinted in STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF
SoUTH AFRicA, supra note 9, at 559, 561; see also Fedler, supra note 100, at 1008.
151. Pupilage is an internship for advocates, lasting from four to six months, under an
advocate with more than five years experience. See van Buuren, supra note 23, at 390 n. 52.
Although not required by law, it is required for membership in the Society of Advocates. The
majority of advocates complete a pupilage. See Jasodha H. Maharaj, The Role of the Law
Schools in Practical Legal Training, 111 S. AFR. LJ. 328, 328 n. 2 (1994).
152. See supra note 140 regarding the salaries of articled clerks. Aspiring attorneys taking
the community service option could be compensated similarly.
153. Sarkin, supra note 123, at 229 n.44.
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At present it is not clear whether the envisaged public defenders
should be attorneys or advocates or some of both. Public defenders
in less serious cases could be exclusively attorneys, as attorneys do
have the right of appearance in lower courts. However, attorneys
may not argue before the divisions of the supreme court, where the
most serious criminal cases are tried.'
A public defender system, as well as legal aid in general, would
benefit from eradicating the distinction between attorneys and
advocates. First, the attorney has become familiar with all of the facts
of a case and all of the relevant legal issues. To have that person put
the information into a form which can be easily accessed by a person
unfamiliar with it is a waste of time and effort that could be avoided
by simply having the already-familiar attorney argue the case.
Second, it seems inevitable that some factual details or some nuances
of the client's case, that perhaps do not seem important at the time,
but which may be made relevant by unforeseen twists of the trial, will
be lost in the transfer of information. Third, optimally, the attorney
will have a relationship of trust with the client, which is not something
easily transferred to an advocate with whom the client is not familiar.
An integrated system would utilize'time far more efficiently, allowing
a greater number of cases to be handled by fewer lawyers.
2. Increasing Available Manpower. Other than Legal Aid
Board referrals, the existing legal profession does not make a large
contribution to the representation of indigent criminal defendants. At
their own discretion, advocates may accept cases for less than the
required fee, but there is some evidence that this practice, known as
pro amico representation, has decreased since the creation of the
Legal Aid Board. 5 One way to increase indigent representaation
by private counsel would be to promulgate legislation or bar
regulations requiring each lawyer to contribute a certain number of
hours of community service legal work per year."6 However, such
a system may prove incapable of meeting the vast need for criminal
defense for several reasons. First, this practice would involve some
of the same drawbacks as the referral system-a lawyer inexperienced
154. See van Buuren, supra note 23, at 390 n.52.
155. See id. at 397. In non pro amico cases, advocates are required by the bar to charge a
minimum fee. Id. at 397 n.111.
156. Similar proposals are being considered by state bars in the United States. See, eg.,
Ronald Sullivan, Poverty Lawyers Swamped by Work, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1989, at B3
(discussing proposed mandatory pro bono service for the New York Bar).
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in criminal practice would take more time to prepare a case and
would probably provide a less effective defense than would an experi-
enced criminal lawyer. The distinction between attorneys aid
advocates would again aggravate the problem, requiring two volun-
teers rather than one for cases argued before the supreme court
divisions. Second, if lawyers were permitted to allocate their public
service hours to projects of their choosing, most would probably
choose to handle the more familiar civil cases.'
A more promising proposal is to entirely replace the system of
articles with a mandatory public service requirement.' 8 Two years,
or even one, of continuous service would be far more useful than the
equivalent number of hours spread over a legal career. In conjunc-
tion with a dissolution of the distinction between attorneys and
advocates, all prospective lawyers could be subject to the same public
service requirement before being admitted to the bar. 59 Because
the majority of law graduates are likely to go into civil practice, public
service time could be split between criminal defense work and civil
work in a Legal Aid office, allowing the candidate lawyers to gain
exposure to both types of practice. A public service requirement is
not likely to be met with a great deal of legitimate resistance by South
African law students because these students already expect to spend
some period of time in a required internship, whether articles or
pupilage. " * In addition, their legal educations are heavily subsi-
dized by the government, putting them in a position of indebtedness
to the public. 6'
3. Changing Legal Education. In order for a public defender
system utilizing new lawyers to be effective, South African law schools
may have to make some changes in legal education. For example, in
order to better prepare students for their public service requirements,
law schools could increase emphasis on clinical training. Such
157. While there is, of course, a need for volunteers to assist with civil cases as well, this does
not help to alleviate the problem of indigent criminal defendants.
158. Sarkin, supra note 123, at 224.
159. If the dual-bar system persists, as it is likely to, both attorneys and advocates could still
be required to perform the public service internship, but duties could be assigned with respect
to the candidate's career goal.
160. See Sarkin, supra note 123, at 229.
161. For example, in 1993, one year of an LL.B. program at one South African university
cost students an estimated R8210, with an approximated cost to the State of R90,000 per student
for the entire program. Fedler, supra note 100, at 1004 n.13.
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changes, as well as many other ideas for altering legal education that
are beyond the scope of this Note, have already been suggested.'62
One potential reform of legal education that is particularly
relevant to a potential public defender program, however, has been
made possible by the new constitution. Currently, a student desiring
admission to the bar must complete university level courses in
English, Afrikaans, and Latin.'" These language requirements, and
the fact that law courses are conducted in English or Afrikaans, have
proven to be a stumbling block for many black students, very few of
whom speak either language as a first language.64 Moreover,
before the drafting of the 1994 Constitution, English and Afrikaans
were South Africa's only official languages and court proceedings
were generally conducted in one or the other with interpreters
provided for those who were not sufficiently familiar with the
language used.'6
The new provisional constitution specifies isiNdebele, Sesotho sa
Leboa, Sesotho, siSwati, Xitsonga, Setswana, Tshivenda, isiXhosa, and
isiZulu, as well as English and Afrikaans, as official languages.'
It is not yet clear how the elevation of these languages to official
status will affect the conduct of court proceedings, but the constitution
allows provincial legislatures to designate any of the above languages
as the official language for all or part of the province.67 Presum-
ably, regional or district court proceedings within a province that has
designated an official language would be conducted in that official
language. Amending bar requirements to allow an advocate who
demonstrates proficiency in the official language of a province to be
admitted to the bar for that province, without meeting the English,
Afrikaans, and Latin requirements, could allow a more rapid increase
in the number of capable advocates available to represent indigent
defendants. In addition, law courses could be conducted in the
primary language of the province in which the school is located,
removing one of the disincentives to enroll in law school and allowing
for the more rapid expansion of the legal profession. While one
162. See, e-g., Maharaj, supra note 152, at 328; Mauro Cappelletti, The Future of Legal
Education: A Comparative Perspective, 8 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 1 (1992).
163. Fedler, supra note 100, at 1002 n.7.
164. Id. at 1001-02.
165. See N.C. Steytler, Implementing Language Rights in Court: The Role of the Court
Interpreter, 9 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 205, 206 (1993).
166. S. AFR. CoNsr. ch. 1, § 3 (1).
167. Id. ch. 1 § 3(5).
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might worry that removing the language requirements would lead to
the creation of a Tower of Babel inside each courtroom, interpreters
are already an entrenched feature of South African courts."6
Although having one's lawyer rely on an interpreter to translate court
proceedings may not be the optimal situation for a defendant, in
almost all cases it would be preferable to having the lawyer altogether
absent from the proceedings.
V. CONCLUSION
South Africa faces a long and arduous process of change in order
to add substance to the skeleton of an indigent defendant's right to
be provided with counsel at state expense. That process is not an
impossible one. Whether or not it will be accomplished depends
largely upon the value that the government and the legal profession
are willing to place on protecting and ensuring the right to counsel for
indigent defendants. The theoretical underpinnings of the new South
Africa-equality and justice in particular-seem to demand immediate
fulfillment of the needs of many parties, all of whom are contending
for limited resources. Not only do equality and justice require the
protection of the right to counsel, but they also require the immediate
return of lands confiscated during apartheid, immediate integration of
and equal funding for the previously segregated schools, and
immediate access to equal and adequate health care. The indigent
criminal accused are not the only group of South Africans waiting for
the proclaimed new era to have some practical meaning in their
individual lives and it is easily conceivable that their needs may not
be a first priority. The existence of the right to be provided with
counsel still represents a major victory, but the fruits of that victory
may not be enjoyed by the victors for years to come.
Jennifer L. Huber
168. See Steytler, supra note 165, at 206.
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